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NOTES AND COMMENTS
and under circumstances in which the deceased should be considered to
have "assumed the risk" of the undertaking. This carries the affirmative
proximate cause idea to its logical conclusion and points out the inade-
quacy of this theory when applied as the sole criterion for establishing
the implied crime of felony-murder. The split decision in this case
shows a dissatisfaction within the court which has advanced the theory
most strongly.41
The use of affirmative proximate cause is not necessary for the ob-
taining of murder convictions when such ought to be obtained.42  If its
use is helpful in the understanding of what the law is doing in felony-
murder cases, such use should be limited to those cases where a person
trying to prevent a felony dangerous to human life accidentally kills
someone other than one of the felons.
JAMES P. CREws.
Damages-Loss of Profits-Standard of Certainty
Calling our attention to a much litigated area of damage law is the
case of Evergreen Amusement Corporation v. Milstead.1  The plaintiff
had contracted to perform the excavation for an outdoor theater, but
delayed completion two and one-half months beyond the date specified.
To the plaintiff's action to recover the agreed price for the job, the de-
fendant filed a counterclaim seeking damages for the lost profits caused
by the delay. The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow re-
covery of such profits holding them to be too speculative for the jury to
" The three dissenting judges based their dissents mainly on the fact that the
killing was justifiable, and thus concluded that no one, either legally or morally,
should have been held guilty of murder. This question involves to some extent
a consideration of the wording of the Pennsylvania statute. "All murder ...
which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930). It was an obvious begging of
the question if such wording was meant to declare certain killings murder. All
such a statute can do is raise certain murders to first degree murder. Whether
or not the killing is murder depends on the common law definition.
In thirteen states (Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming) and
the District of Columbia, some form of the word "kill" is used instead of "mur-
der"; thus these statutes are definitive in nature. The same is true in Alabama,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, where "homicide is used. The Wisconsin
statute refers to causing the death. The rest of the felony-murder statutes are like
Pennsylvania's in using "murder."
"
2 A casual polling of laymen has revealed no one who felt that the defendant in
this case ought to be considered a murderer. The principal case deals with a set of
facts never previously considered in a reported decision in the United States.
Appeal would follow automatically on such an unsettled issue if prosecution were
brought. It would be absurd to say that a similar set of facts never existed be-
fore. The reason for failure to prosecute for murder in such a case must be the
failure on the part of the states' officials to consider it appropriate, or even to
consider it at all.
1206 Md. 610, 112 A. 2d 901 (1955).
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assess. A fair rental value of the theater property was allowed as an
alternative remedy.2
Denial of recovery for lost profits is commonly based on the court's
determination that such profits are too uncertain and speculative. The
general rule for recovering any damages is that the plaintiff must show
that he has suffered a loss and must show to a reasonable certainty the
nature and extent of the loss. 3 On this reasoning the early American
courts refused recovery for lost profits altogether, but the present view is
to allow such a recovery if the loss is the natural result of the defendant's
wrong, and the loss is not uncertain or speculative. 4
The North Carolina story has not been unique. Attempts to recover
damages for lost profits have arisen frequently in two situations: in-
terference in the cultivation of agricultural crops and interference with
business enterprises. At the risk of generalizing, it may be said that
the early North Carolina Court denied recovery in both instancesYz
Representative of the early view in respect to crops is the case of
Roberts v. Cole. The court refused plaintiff's attempt to recover antici-
pated profits stating that what the crop would have been worth was
"purely and wholly speculative." This reasoning was followed in a later
case where the rice seed, which defendant had sold the plaintiff, failed
to sprout. The court stated: ". . . [W]e have concluded, after mature
reflection and a careful study . . . that the principle ... in Roberts v.
Cole applies. ... -7 It is interesting to note that only two years later
the court in Herring v. Armwoods did allow recovery of damages for lost
profits where the defendant breached his contract to fertilize the soil.
2 The decision turned on the fact that the lost profits sought were for a new
business as distingiushed from an established business where damages could be
more certainly determined by assessing lost profits on the basis of previous earnings.
1 SEGDWIcic, DAMAGES § 170 (9th ed. 1920).
'25 C. J. S., DAMAGES § 41 (1941).
However, there has always been an alternative remedy. In the case of crops
it is normally the fair rental value of the land under cultivation, plus the plaintiff's
expenditures frustrated by the defendant's wrong. Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230,
37 S. E. 217 (1900). In the case of lost profits for business enterprise, the alterna-
tive remedy is normally the legal interest on the capital investment which is made
unproductive by the defendant's wrong. Foard v. Atlantic and North Carolina
R. R, 53 N. C. 235 (1860). Of course, the defendant has the right to prove that
the plaintiff did minimize his damages or had reasonable opportunity to do so.
Reiger v. Worth, supra (crops) and Jones v. Call, 96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647
(1887) (business).
682 N. C. 293 (1880).
Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230, 236, 37 S. E. 217, 219 (1900). In this de-
cision the court made no mention of the earlier case of Spencer v. Hamilton,
113 N. C. 49, 18 S. E. 167 (1893) where the plaintiff was allowed recovery for
the lessening of his net yield by the defendant's failure to maintain adequate ditches
as he had contracted to do.
8 130 N. C. 177, 41 S. E. 96 (1902). The court did not discuss the dcision in
the Reiger case, note 7 supra, but based its decision on the Spencer case, note 7
supra. Doubtless the court was influenced by the character of the defendants'
wrongs; however, its reasoning was based solely on the issue of certainty.
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Since the Herring decision the rule has become well established that the
value of the lost crop may be recovered. But the plaintiff has the
burden of provilg what the crop would have been worth but for the
defendant's wrong. Where the only evidence as to the anticipated value
of the crop was plaintiff's testimony as to what he thought it would have
been, the court denied recovery. 10 And where the plaintiff merely made
a comparison of the crop yield of one year with that of another the court
denied recovery, but in so doing enumerated some of the evidence which
should have been presented. 1  The recent case of Perry v. Doub12 re-
flects the court's present liberal view on the recovery of lost profits for
damage to crops.'3 Interestingly enough, the plaintiff had based his
claim for loss of profits on the defendant's breach of contract to loan
money, thus preventing a maximum crop production.14
The liberal trend of the court in allowing recovery for lost profits
where the plaintiff's crop has been damaged has also characterized the
court's reaction to attempts for recovery of lost profits in business ven-
tures. Where there was an existing contract calling for short term per-
formance by the plaintiff, loss of anticipated profits was allowed as the
measure of damages. Thus, where defendant reneged on his agreement
to allow plaintiff to grind his corn at a profit of three cents per bushel,
the court allowed the loss of such profits. 15 And where a contract called
for the manufacture and sale of certain machinery from which plaintiff
expected to make twelve hundred dollars profit, the court allowed re-
covery of that amount.16 Other cases have allowed similar recoveries. 1 7
' Gulley v. Raynor, 185 N. C. 96, 116 S. E. 171 (1928); Perry v. Kime, 169
N. C. 540, 86 S. E. 337 (1915).
10 Gulley v. Raynor, 185 N. C. 96, 116 S. E. 171 (1928).
"1 Perry v. Kime, 169 N. C. 540, 86 S. E. 337 (1915). "The character of the
soil and its condition; the kind of seed used, when planted and how; the prepara-
tion of the soil for planting; the quality of fertilizer, the quantity and the time and
manner of its application; the cultivation of the crop; the harvesting of the crop;
the seasons, and other circumstances enter into the estimate of what ought to be
made. .. "12238 N. C. 233, 77 S. E. 2d 711 (1953).
1 Counsel should be wary, however, when the claim for lost profits is based
on inferior fertilizer purchased from a fertilizer company. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 106-50.7 (4) (1952) proscribes the bringing of any action for damages based
on inferior fertilizer purchased from a fertilizer company, except where enumerated
requirements are met. These statutory requirements are so numerous and so
technical that the bringing of such actions is virtually barred. However, where
the farmer-defendant gave his promissory notes for the purchase price of fer-
tilizer the statute did not prevent his defense of failure of consideration based
on faulty fertilizer in an action by the payee-plaintiff. Swift & Co. v. Aydlett,
192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926).
"' The general rule seems to be that the normal damage for breach of contract
to loan money is the difference that plaintiff would have had to pay in interest and
expenses under the contract and that paid for a similar loan elsewhere. Mc-
CORMICK, DAMAGES § 139 (1935).
1 Oldham v. Kerchner, 79 N. C. 106 (1878).1 0 Jones v. Call, 96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).
Recovery for anticipated profits from accommodating tourists with a pleasure
boat which defendant had contracted for hire. Mace v. Ramsey, 74 N. C. 11
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Where no such contract existed and the plaintiff sought recovery
for the anticipated general profits of his business, the early North Caro-
lina Court denied them as too speculative. In Boyle v. Reeder'8 the
defendant failed to deliver certain machinery on the agreed date. The
court clearly expressed its aversion to the plaintiff's attempt to recover
his lost profits: "Very certainly, damages are not to be measured by
any such vague and indeterminate notion of anticipated and fancied
profits of a business or adventure which depends so much on skill experi-
ence, good management and good luck for success." ' A clear contrast
of lost profits in the "existing contract" category and the "general
profits" category is found in Jones v. Call.20 The plaintiff was allowed
the lost profits expected from existing contracts but was denied any
recovery for the expected profits on the "continued manufacture and
sale" of machinery. A more recent case refused the plaintiff's attempt
to recover the lost profits anticipated from the operation of a barber-
shop.21
Without belaboring a summary of the intervening case law22 one may
find the present viewpoint of the court as to lost business profits in
Perkins v. Langdon23s where an oral agreement between the parties
provided that the defendant would lease a tobacco warehouse to the
plaintiff for three market seasons. The defendant refused to continue
the lease after the first season and the plantiff's action sought recovery
for his lost prospective profits. Recovery was allowed based on the pe-
culiarly favorable evidence for meeting the certainty standard: govern-
ment control of tobacco crops, stabilization of tobacco prices by fixing
floor prices of all grades of tobacco, and statutory requirements for main-
taining accurate sales records.24  This commendable decision should
lead in the future to the court's according greater weight to sound
economic data for purposes of meeting the certainty standard.
Although the American courts have liberalized their views in allow-
(1876); plaintiff recovered $27,000, the expected profits from the manufacture
and sale of cell doors for the state penitentiary. Clements v. State, 77 N. C. 142
(1877).1823 N. C. 607 (1841).
19 Id. at 614.
2096 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).21Brewington v. Loughran, 183 N. C. 558, 112 S. E. 257 (1922).
-z Other, but not all, similar North Carolina decisions are: Foard v. Atlantic
and North Carolina R. R., 53 N. C. 235 (1860) ; Winston Cigarette Machine Co.
v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., 141 N. C. 284, 53 S. E. 885 (1906) ; Thompson
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 165 N. C. 377, 81 S. E. 315 (1914) ; Reliable Trucking
Co. v. Payne, 233 N. C. 637, 68 S. E. 2d 288 (1951).23237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953).
2 Notice that the action was brought after the expiration date agreed upon in
the lease. The evidence relied upon to meet the certainty standard would not have
been available had the action been brought immediately upon the defendant's
breach. Plaintiffs might be well advised to delay suit in order to accumulate the
necessary evidence to support their claims for lost profits.
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ing recovery for lost profits there still remains a standard of certainty
to be met. It is significant that this standard is not applied in other
areas of damage law.25  Recognizing the speculative character of the
plaintiff's claim, courts nevertheless allow the claim as the measure of
damage, for instance, loss of consortium, 26 invasion of privacy,27 and im-
pairment of an infant's earning capacity after he reaches his majority.28
No decisions have undertaken to analyze the rationale for applying the
standard in some instances and not applying it in others. Justification
that the standard restrains excessive verdicts is hardly valid, since the
remittitur safeguard would be equally effective for lost profits as it
would for personal injury claims. Quaere whether such a restraint is
necessary.29  It has been suggested that the availability of alternative
remedies motivates the courts' application of the standard in actions for
lost profits.30 But the alternative remedies do not necessarily achieve
the purpose of money damages, making the plaintiff whole. Some
justification might be found in the business-plaintiff's ability to offset his
injury through additional efforts for profits, as contrasted with the
usual inability of the personally injured plaintiff to do so. A broader
reason could be urged that the policy of spreading the loss can be
effectuated through the business-plaintiff's own efforts, whereas in the
case of the personally injured plaintiff, the aid of the court is needed.
These conjectures can be nothing more than rationalizations for the
now well-entrenched standard of certainty.
According to one authority the extensive use of the certainty standard
is a peculiar American contribution to damage law.31 This being true
" "In the tort field, it has in fact no application at all to the measurement of
damages to interest of personality, such as claims for pain, mental anguish, or
humiliation, nor, of course, to punitive damages." MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 32,
p. 124 (1935).
21 "The value of such loss must be determined by the triers of fact in the
exercise of a sound discretion in the light of their own experience, observation
and reflection." Gist v. French, 288 P. 2d 1003, 1009 (Cal. App., 1955).
27 "The measure of damages therefore is for the trier of fact, and in assessing
such damages he is accorded a wide and elastic discretion." Fairfield v. American
Photocopy Equipment Co., 291 P. 2d 194, 198 (Cal. App., 1955).
28 "... [I~t is clear enough . . . that a finding of impaired earning capacity
afterwards would have been nothing more substantial than a mere speculation ...
[T]he law furnishes no measure of damages other than the enlightened conscience
of impartial jurors, guided by all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case." Birmingham Electric Co. v. Cleveland, 216 Ala. 455, 459, 113 So. 403, 406
(1927).
2" By the very nature of the claim, the plaintiff will ordinarily be a corporation
or other type of business association. It is common knowledge that this type
party defendant is jeopardized in accident litigation merely because of what it is.
Would it not follow that a jury's sentiments would be against awarding excessive
verdicts to that type plaintiff?
"oNote, 64 HAiv. L. Rv. 317, 324 (1950).
$' McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §§ 25, 26 (1935): "This elaboration of the doctrines
relating to the standard of 'certainty,' . . .is a by-product of the jury System,
springing from the lack of confidence of American judges in the discretion of
juries."
1956]
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the standard will probably enjoy a long and productive career in our
country. But realizing the enhancement of the economy by business' re-
liance and action on anticipated gains, the courts should continue to
liberalize the requirements for satisfying the standard. This may be
accomplished without invading the principles involved by an increased
reliance on available economic data and a more sympathetic attitude
towards efforts for progress and achievement.
RICHMOND BERNHARDT, JR.
Evidence-The Dead Man's Statute-Personal Transaction
In the recent case of Hardison v. Gregory' the North Carolina
Supreme Court once again had before it the problem of deciding whether
a particular fact situation constituted a "personal transaction or com-
munication" between an interested witness and a deceased person under
N. C. G. S. § 8-51, commonly referred to as "the dead man's statute."'2
It should be noted that the statute does not disqualify all witnesses
or all testimony. A very good analysis of the statute was made by Jus-
tice Ervin in the case of Peek v. Shook3 as follows:
"This statute does not render the testimony of a witness in-
competent unless these four questions require an affirmative
answer:
"1. Is the witness (a) a party to the action, or (b) a person
interested in the event of the action,4 or (c) a person from,
through or under whom such a party or interested person derives
his interest or title?
1242 N. C. 324, 82 S. E. 2d 96 (1955). See Case Law Survey, 34 N. C. L.
REv. 53 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51. "Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon
the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a person interested in the event,
or a person from, through or under whom such a party or interested person de-
rives his interest or title, by assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or person, or the committee of a lunatic, or the person
deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person or lunatic,
by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction or communication
between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except where the executor,
administrator, survivor, committee or person deriving title or interest is examined
in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in
evidence concerning the same transaction or communication."
Exclusionary statutes of this type are in effect in all but three states: Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. In New Mexico, Oregon and Vir-
ginia, the interested party may testify, but his testimony uncorroborated is in-
sufficient to support a recovery. 2 WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 578 (3rd ed. 1940).
233 N. C. 259, 63 S. E. 2d 542 (1951). See also: Bunn v. Todd, 107 N. C.
266, 11 S. E. 1043 (1890) and STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 66 (1946).
' "The interest which determines the competency of a witness under the statute
is a present direct pecuniary interest." Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 61, 69
S. E. 2d 156, 160 (1952). See also: Price v. Askins; 212 N. C. 583, 194 S. E. 284
(1937) ; Burton v. Styers, 210 N. C. 230, 186 S. E. 248 (1936) ; In re Gorham, 177
N. C. 271, 98, S. E. 717 (1919).
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